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The After-Acquired Evidence Rule:
The Best of All Possible Worlds?
SHARONA HOFFMAN

Although the Supreme Court provided substantial guidance in its
McKennon decision, it left several significant questions unanswered.
These questions include the following: (1) To which antidiscrimination statutes does the McKennon standard apply? (2) What is the

employer's standard ofproof with respect to after-acquired evidence?
(3) To what extent, if any, should compensatory damages, punitive
damages, liquidated damages, and attomey fees be limited in afteracquired evidence cases? ( 4) Which conditions constitute "extraordinary equitable circumstances" that may alter the scope ofrelief under
the McKennon standard? In order to find answers to these questions,
the author examines the EEOC Enforcement Guidance conceming
after-acquired evidence, which was published in December 1995.In
addition, she analyzes several court decisions and legal commentaries and provides her own insight into these issues.

uestions regarding after-acquired evidence arise in the arena of
employment discrimination law when an employee challenges a
d s arge as discriminatory, and the employer subsequently learns of
particular acts of employee wrongdoing which would have justifi,ed the
termination if previously known. 1 After-acquired evidence can be
defined as evidence of employee misconduct that is not known by the
employer at the date of the discharge. 2
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879
(1995), the Supreme Court determined the extent to which afteracquired evidence may serve as a bar to recovery in an employment
discrimination case. In an effort to evaluate the impact of the
McKennon decision on charges of discrimination filed with the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the EEOC
issued "Enforcement Guidance on after-acquired evidence and
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 65 EPD
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9[43,368 (1995)," Notice No. 915.002, dated December 14, 1995
(hereinafter "Guidance" or "EEOC Enforcement Guidance"). In addition, numerous legal scholars have offered their own interpretations
and criticisms of the McKennon decision and have expressed concern
over questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court. This article
analyzes the guidelines delineated by the McKennon opinion and the
EEOC and discusses the after-acquired evidence issues yet to be
elucidated by the courts.

MCKENNON V. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING CO.:
RESOLUTION OF A SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
The use of after-acquired evidence as a defense in employment
discrimination cases was extensively debated for almost a decade prior
to the issuance of the McKennon decision. Circuit courts which
considered the issue reached conflicting decisions, making the afteracquired evidence question ripe for resolution by the Supreme Court.

Prior Circuit Court Decisions
In Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 864
F.2d 700 (lOth Cir. 1988), the Tenth Circuit held that after-acquired
evidence functioned as a complete bar to recovery in a case alleging
age and religious discrimination. The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's granting of summary judgment to the employer based
on evidence that the plaintiff, a State Farm claims representative,
continued to falsify company records after being warned that such
conduct would result in termination. Although the evidence was
discovered four years after the date of discharge, the court determined
that it precluded the plaintiff's recovery for claims of discrimination.
The Summers rule was followed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits
and inconsistently by the Seventh Circuit. 3
In contrast, in Wallacev. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th
Cir. 1992), vacated pending rehearing en bane, 32 F.3d 1489 (1994),
affirmed in part, revised in part, 62 F.3d 374 0995), the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that evidence of an employee's application fraud, discovered after
she had instituted suit for retaliation and sexual harassment, could not bar
her from relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court
rejected the Summers rule, deeming it "antithetical to the primary purpose
of Title VII-'to achieve equality of employment opportunity"' by
encouraging "employers to eliminate discrimination." The court stated
that the Summers ruling invited employers to escape liability by rummaging through an unlawfully discharged employee's background in order to
discover flaws which it can claim would constitute legitimate reasons for
80
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discharge. The Wallace approach was followed by the Third Circuit and
at times by the Seventh Circuit, which itself issued contradictory rulings
regarding after-acquired evidence. 4

Facts and Holding of McKennon
In 1995, in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. the
Supreme Court resolved the split, essentially adopting the Wallace
approach. The case involved an age discrimination claim brought by a 62year-old woman who had worked for Nashville Banner Publishing
Company for 30 years before being discharged, purportedly as part of a
reduction-in-force. During her deposition, McKennon admitted that prior
to being terminated, she had copied and removed from the defendant's
headquarters several confidential financial documents because she
wanted "insurance" and "protection" once she became concerned that
"she was about to be fired because of her age." When it learned of the
misconduct, the defendant sent McKennon a letter informing her that she
had violated her job responsibilities and advising her that had it learned
of her misconduct while she was still employed, it would have terminated
her immediately as a consequence of her actions.
For purposes of summary judgment, the employer conceded that
it had discriminated against McKennon but argued that McKennon was
entitled to no relief due to her misconduct. In a unanimous opinion,
the Supreme Court held that after-acquired evidence cannot insulate
an employer from liability for violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). The Court noted that the ADEA and Title VII
seek to achieve "the elimination of discrimination in the workplace" by
serving as mechanisms of deterrence and by creating a right of action
for victims of discrimination by which they can obtain redress for
wrongs suffered in violation of the law. The Justices concluded that "[i]t
would not accord with this scheme if after-acquired evidence of
wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination operates, in every
instance, to bar all relief for an earlier violation of the Act."
Under the McKennon ruling, however, the employee's misconduct
is relevant to the formulation of the remedy to be awarded in each case.
The Court stated that it was sensitive to the "employer's legitimate
concerns" and the "lawful prerogatives of the employer in the usual
course of its business." It thus deemed it appropriate to consider the
employee's wrongdoing in determining the extent of the complainant's
remedy even if the misconduct is unearthed only in the course of
discovery in a discrimination action and would have remained
undetected absent the lawsuit.
The Court ruled that an employer that seeks to rely on after-acquired
Employee Relations L. J./Vol. 22, No. 2/Autumn 1996
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evidence must establish that the wrongdoing was so severe that the
employee would in fact have been terminated due solely to the
misconduct had the employer been aware of it. Once the certainty of a
discharge has been established, however, neither reinstatement nor front
pay constitutes an appropriate remedy. In fact, it would be illogical to
order reinstatement of an individual whom the employer could lawfully
fire immediately upon the commencement of his re-employment due to
prior misconduct. Furthermore, the Court instructed that back pay should
be calculated "from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new
information was discovered." The Court added, however, that courts may
also consider "extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the
legitimate interests of either party," thus declining to create an
unyieldingly rigid rule but leaving unanswered questions regarding the
nature of the egregious circumstances which would justify a deviation
from its general standard.
The Court acknowledged that defendants may have an incentive
to engage in extensive discovery into the former employee's background and job performance in order to resist claims brought under the
ADEA. Such discovery would seek solely to unearth instances of prior
employee misconduct that would limit liability with respect to the
plaintiffs ADEA claim. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the
threats of attorney fees and Rule 11 sanctions will be sufficient to deter
most discovery abuses.

The Unclean Hands Defense
It is significant to note that the Court explicitly rejected the "unclean
hands defense" for after-acquired evidence cases involving employment discrimination claims. The clean hands doctrine proposes that
equity will not grant relief to a party who, "in his prior conduct has
violated conscience or good faith or other equitable principle." 5 The
Court rejected the unclean hands defense based on the fact that the
case, although a private suit, involved "important public purposes"
and, as an action brought under a federal antidiscrimination statute,
implicated congressional authorization of "broad equitable relief to
serve important national policies."
One commentator notes several additional reasons for the rejection
of the unclean hands defense. 6 She notes that the application of the
unclean hands defense in employment discrimination cases would
result in inequity in most cases. The previously undiscovered employee misconduct generally causes the employer little if any damage.
In McKennon the harm consisted of limited financial and personnel
information being revealed to an employee's husband. In cases of
82
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falsification of a detail on the employee's resume, the employer often
suffers no injury whatsoever. By contrast, the victim of discrimination
suffers significant psychological and financial injury due to the loss of
the job, income, benefits, reputation, dignity, and sense of self-worth?
Furthermore, courts have imposed a "same transaction" limitation,
requiring that the conduct giving rise to the defense of unclean hands
be connected to the controversy at issue. 8 Thus, if "the right claimed
in the suit did not accrue because of [the misconduct], the misconduct
will be held to be collateral and not to defeat the right to affirmative
relief." 9 In employment discrimination cases involving after-acquired
evidence, the victim's right to recovery for the employer's discrimination does not arise from the employee's wrongdoing, which often
precedes the unlawful adverse employment decision by years if not
decades. By definition, the employer's decision is made without
knowledge of or regard to the employee's misconduct, which is
discovered only after the fact. Thus, for a multitude of reasons the clean
hands doctrine cannot be utilized by defendants in after-acquired
evidence cases related to employment discrimination claims.

FURTHER ANALYSIS BY THE EEOC, THE COURTS,
AND LEGAL SCHOLARS
The McKennon decision provided much-needed guidance as to
the remedies available to plaintiffs in after-acquired evidence cases.
Nevertheless, the Court left several significant questions unanswered.
These questions include the following: (1) To which antidiscrimination
statutes does the McKennon standard apply? (2) What is the employer's
standard of proof with respect to after-acquired evidence? (3) To what
extent, if any, should compensatory damages, punitive damages,
liquidated damages, and attorney's fees be limited in after-acquired
evidence cases? ( 4) Which conditions constitute "extraordinary equitable circumstances" that may alter the scope of relief under the
McKennon standard? Detailed answers to most of these questions are
contained in EEOC Guidance published in December 1995. In addition, several court decisions and legal commentaries provide further
insight into the after-acquired evidence defense.

To Which Antidiscrimination Statutes Does the

McKennon Decision Apply?
The McKennon decision applied explicitly only to after-acquired
evidence in ADEA cases. The Supreme Court noted, however, that the
"ADEA is but part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in
the workplace nationwide." It cited Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
Employee Relations L. !./Vol. 22, No. 2/Autumn 1996
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1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 as additional
statutes which prohibit discrimination in the workplace.
Based on this statement, the EEOC determined that the principles
articulated in the McKennon decision are applicable in Title VII and ADA
cases. In addition, the Tenth Circuit, in Wallacev. Dunn Construction Co.,
Inc., 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995), concluded, based on the above-cited
Supreme Court language, "that the holding of McKennon is applicable to
claims brought under Title VII and tl1e Equal Pay Act." It is thus e:il.'tremely
unlikely that employers will be able to utilize after-acquired evidence to
defeat non-age employment discrimination claims by arguing that the
McKennon decision is limited only to ADEA cases.

The Employer's Standard of Proof
The Supreme Court established that an employer that seeks to
utilize after-acquired evidence to limit the remedy in a particular case
"must first establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the
employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone
if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge." This
standard was elucidated by the Ninth Circuit in McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co. v. O'Day, 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996). The court held that
an employer must "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have fired the employee for that misconduct." It explicitly
rejected the plaintiffs contention that the employer should be required
to meet a higher burden of proof, that is, to prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that the individual would have been terminated.
The EEOC Enforcement Guidance grapples with the issue of how
an employer might prove that it would have terminated the employee
solely because of the misconduct in question. The clearest scenario, of
course, is one in which other employees have committed the identical
wrongdoing. In such cases the employer's reaction to the other
incidents can be examined to determine how it would have responded
to the plaintiffs misconduct. 10 Thus, if the employer had not terminated
other employees who engaged in behavior identical to that in question,
the employer could not utilize the after-acquired evidence to curtail
back pay or eliminate other forms of relief.
The case is far more difficult if the employer has no prior
experience with the misconduct at issue. In such instances, the EEOC
suggests that the following three factors be considered: (1) whether the
misconduct is criminal in nature; (2) whether the employee's behavior
compromised the integrity of the employer's business, such as via
divulgence of trade secrets or other confidential information; or (3)
84
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whether the adverse employment action appears reasonable and
justifiable in light of the employee's misconduct. In addition, the court
might determine whether the employer has ever stated that the conduct
in question will lead to termination in its employee handbook, in a
policy memorandum, or in an orientation or other training session.
The misconduct in McKennon occurred during the plaintiff's employment. Commonly, however, the after-acquired evidence consists of a
misrepresentation on the employee's resume or application form, which
the employer discovers after it begins investigating the individual's
background in the face of a discrimination claim. 11 One might ask whether
in such cases the employer should be required to prove that the employee
would have been fired upon discovery of the misrepresentation during
his or her employment or whether the employer need prove only that the
employee would not have been hired if the misstatement had been
discovered prior to commencement of the employment.
The Fifth Circuit provided an answer to this question in a case entitled
Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106 (5th Cir. 1995), which
involved an employee who had stated in his application that he was a
college graduate, but was found on the eve of trial to have completed less
than a year of college work. The court ruled that "the pertinent inquiry,
except in refusal-to-hire cases, is whether the employee would have been
fired upon discovery of the wrongdoing, not whether he would have been
hired in the first instance." The EEOC Enforcement Guidance adopted the
Fifth Circuit rule, adding that logically, in discriminatory refusal-to-hire
cases, the pertinent question is whether the employer would have actually
rejected the candidate had it been aware of the subsequently discovered
evidence during the application process. Since the plaintiff in a discriminatory failure-to-hire case never began working for the employer, the
question of whether he would have been tenninated had he become an
employee is irrelevant.
The distinction between the two inquiries is a significant one. The
Fifth Circuit in Shattuck reasoned that an employer may retain an
employee who has performed successfully even though the employee
does not have the qualifications claimed in his application materials.
Thus, an employee guilty of application fraud might be forgiven for the
wrongdoing once he proves himself to be a valuable performer and
after the employer has invested substantial resources in training him,
even though he would not have been initially hired had his misrepresentation been discovered during the application process. In such
instances, the employer suffers no injury as a result of the employee
wrongdoing, and equity would not be served by limiting recovery for
an unlawful act of discrimination on the part of the employer.
Employee Relations L. !./Vol. 22, No. 2/Autumn 1996
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Furthermore, it is reasonable to impose upon the employer a high
burden of proof in an application fraud case since employers have the
opportunity to conduct background checks regarding their applicants
and to call references to verify information contained in the employment application. In fact, it may be disingenuous for an employer that
was lax and did not investigate the applicant's history at the time of hire
to claim that it is so offended by the misrepresentation that it would
have fired the employee fOi the wrongdoing and should benefit from
the after-acquired evidence rule.

Compensatory Damages
The McKennon Court determined that in after-acquired evidence
cases, back pay will be limited to that which accrued between the date
of the discriminatory termination and the date of discovery of the
employee's wrongdoing. The Court, however, did not reach the issue of
the availability of compensatory and punitive damages in after-acquired
evidence cases. The EEOC, in its Guidance, advised that pecuniary
compensatory damages, that is, damages representing out-of-pocket
losses such as job search expenses, like back pay, stop accruing on the
date the evidence of wrongdoing is discovered, if that misconduct would
justify termination by the employer. The Guidance quotes the language
of the McKennon Court, which emphasizes that the "object of compensation is to restore the employee to the position he or she would have been
in absent the discrimination" without ignoring "the lawful prerogatives of
the employer in the usual course of its business. "12 Curtailing pecuniary
compensatory damages at the time of discovery of the wJsconduct is
sensible since at that time the employee would have been terminated in
any case and would have begun accruing the expenses in question
regardless of the discrimination.
In contrast, the EEOC has concluded that nonpecuniary compensatory damages, those designed to compensate the victim of discrimination for emotional harm, are unaffected by the discovery of afteracquired evidence. In McKennon the Supreme Court emphasized that
remedies in after-acquired evidence cases should be limited not in
order to punish the employee, but rather out of consideration for the
valid business concerns of the employer. The EEOC Guidance notes
that "no legitimate business prerogatives are served by exonerating a
proven discriminator from paying the full cost of the emotional damage
caused by the discrimination." 13 Nonpecuniary compensatory damages, provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, are designed to
compensate the victim for emotional distress suffered because of the
discrimination itself. 14 Consequently, the employee should be entitled
86
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to the full extent of proven damages. caused by the humiliation and
degradation of discrimination, even if he or she would have been
terminated for other reasons. On the other hand, the employee could
be denied compensatory damages for emotional distress suffered after
the date of discovery of the prior misconduct if the distress is linked
not to the fact of discrimination but rather to the condition of
unemployment, which presumably would have occurred regardless of
the employer's unlawful decision.

Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are appropriate when a plaintiff proves that the
employer engaged in discrimination "with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."15 The EEOC has determined that punitive damages, like
nonpecuniary compensatory damages, are unaffected by the discovery
of after-acquired evidence that would justify termination. The EEOC's
Guidance notes that in Russell v. Microdyne, 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.
1995), the Fourth Circuit indicated without discussion that the date of
discovery of the employee's wrongdoing would limit not only back pay
but also all compensatory and punitive damages. The EEOC Enforcement Guidance explicitly rejected the Microdyne court's decision. With
respect to punitive damages, the Guidance asserts that "[i]t is the
employer's motivation at the time of the discriminatory conduct that is
relevant in determining the propriety of punitive damages." 16
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for its
unlawful conduct and to deter other employers from behaving
similarlyY In after-acquired evidence cases, the employer is ignorant
of the misconduct at the time it perpetrates the discriminatory
employment decision. Consequently, limiting punitive damages due to
the belated discovery of employee wrongdoing would be inconsistent
with the goals of deterrence and retribution. 18
It must be recalled that back pay in after-acquired evidence cases
may be very limited due to the discovery of the evidence of wrongdoing very soon after the date of the discriminatory discharge and that
reinstatement and front pay are always excluded. 19 In light of these
restrictions, some commentators have noted that discrimination cases
involving after-acquired evidence issues may not be economically
viable unless the plaintiff can recover substantial compensatory and
punitive damages. Victims of discrimination may hesitate to file
charges of discrimination with the EEOC or to bring suit if their
recovery will be limited to a minimal amount of back pay and
declaratory relief. Thus, employers that violate federal antidiscriminaEmployee Relations L.J./Vol. 22, No. 2/Autumn 1996
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tion laws would not be prosecuted and the policy goals of these
statutes would be undermined. 20

Liquidated Damages
Liquidated damages are available under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act in cases of "willful violations" of the Act. 21 Liquidated
damages are intended to be punitive in nature 22 and are limited to an
amount equal to the employee's lost wages. 23 Similarly, liquidated
damages are available under the Equal Pay Act in an amount equal to
the employee's unpaid compensation. 24 Under the Equal Pay Act,
liquidated damages are mandatory once a violation is found by the
court unless "the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that
the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that
he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was
not a violation" of law. 25
The EEOC Guidance provides that liquidated damages are available in age discrimination and Equal Pay Act cases even where afteracquired evidence of employee misconduct which would justify
termination is found. Since liquidated damages are punitive in nature,
their award is justified by the sarrie rationale that applies to punitive
damages, discussed above. The employer's motive in after-acquired
evidence cases is in fact discriminatory since the proof of prior
employee misconduct is a windfall, obtained by the employer only
after the unlawful adverse employment decision is made. Thus, the
employer should be punished via the imposition of liquidated damages
for conduct which violates the federal antidiscrimination statutes.
Nevertheless, since liquidated damages are limited to an amount
equal to that of the lost wages recovered by the victim of discrimination, these damages are significantly affected by the McKennon
decision. Liquidated damages will be limited to the back pay accrued
by the employee between the date of the adverse employment action
and the date upon which the evidence of misconduct was discovered.

Attorney Fees
The EEOC Guidance does not address the issue of attorney fees,
presumably because, as a federal governmental agency, the EEOC
cannot recover such fees. 26 The McKennon decision explicitly states
that attorney fees are available in after-acquired evidence cases, stating
that "the authority of the courts to award attorney's fees, mandated
under the statute, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) ... will deter most
[discovery] abuses." A question remains, however, as to whether
attorney fees should be reduced if the employer is able to prove that
88
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it would have terminated the employee due to the subsequently
discovered wrongdoing.
In Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., Toastmaster Division, 985
F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993), a Seventh Circuit case which precededMcKennon
but is consistent with its ruling, the court indicated that a portion of the
attorney fees awarded below must be deducted to reflect the time after
the discovery of the plaintiff's falsification of his educational qualifications.
This standard, however, seems unfair and contrary to the purpose of the
federal antidiscrimination statutes. In many cases, evidence of misconduct
may be discovered very soon after a charge of discrimination is filed with
the EEOC, 27 when the employer conducts a thorough investigation of the
employee and his or her background in order to defend itself against the
allegations. Many employees do not hire attorneys until their cases are
ready for litigation, after the EEOC has completed its processing of the
charge of discrimination and the evidence of the employee's tainted
history has been unearthed.
In the alternative, employers may discover the after-acquired
evidence very soon after the hiring of the attorney, during the plaintiff's
deposition early in discovery. In such cases, under the Kristufek rule,
the attorney would be entitled to little if any attorney fees. As a result,
plaintiffs would be discouraged from filing meritorious discrimination
claims, and the congressional objective of eliminating discriminatory
employment practices would be thwarted.
Furthermore, as one commentator has argued, discrimination suits
are filed first and foremost in order to prove employer liability. 28 The
after-acquired evidence defense is merely an affirmative defense. The
need to prove liability does not disappear once after-acquired evidence
is discovered since the case is not subject to dismissal at that point and
the victim of discrimination may still be entitled to a substantial
recovery. Consequently, attorney fees should not be curtailed at the
time the evidence of misconduct is discovered.
In an after-acquired case, however, it may be reasonable to
disallow the award of attorney fees for time devoted to the issue of
after-acquired evidence and to unsuccessfully resisting a reduction of
the recovery due to the employer's affirmative defense. Attorney fees
are awarded to the prevailing party in appropriate cases. 29 Since the
plaintiff in such cases does not prevail with respect to the afteracquired evidence issue, the plaintiff should not be awarded fees
related to that defense.
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court
determined that where a plaintiff has achieved only limited success, the
award of attorney fees for all hours spent by the attorney on the litigation
Employee Relations L. J./Vol. 22, No. 2/Autumn 1996
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may be excessive. The Supreme Court instructed that "[t]he district court
may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may
simply reduce the award to account for the limited success." Eliminating
hours expended on an unsuccessful attempt to disprove the employer's
after-acquired evidence defense would be consistent with the Supreme
Court's approach. Under this standard, attorneys would be required to
maintain records as to whether their work was related to issues of liability
and allowable damages or issues of after-acquired evidence.

Extraordinary Equitable Circumstances That May
Alter the Scope of Relief
In the McKennon opinion, the Supreme Court instructed that "[i]n
determining the appropriate order for relief, the court can consider
taking into further account extraordinary equitable circumstances that
affect the legitimate interests of either party." The Court thus suggested
that in unusual circumstances courts may deviate from the McKennon
guidelines as to relief but did not provide any guidance as to what
events would constitute such extraordinary circumstances.
The EEOC Guidance provides that additional relief is warranted
when the after-acquired evidence is unearthed during a retaliatory
investigation by the employer after a charge of discrimination is filed
with the EEOC. In some instances, an employer may launch an
extensive investigation into the employee's background not in order
to verify the truth or falsehood of the complainant's allegations, but
specifically in order to uncover derogatory information about the
employee or to discourage other employees from filing charges of
discrimination in the future. Since retaliation is itself unlawful under the
federal antidiscrimination laws, 30 the employer should not benefit from
its retaliatory conduct by enjoying a reduction in the back pay owed
to the victim of discrimination. The EEOC Guidance states that where
an employer commences a retaliatory background check with respect
to the employee during an investigation of a charge of discrimination,
back pay should be extended to the date the complaint is resolved.
The EEOC Guidance has been criticized by some plaintiff's
attorneys as being too lax and unduly generous to employers. 31 Civil
rights attorneys have emphasized that the EEOC's rule is limited to
retaliatory investigations conducted during the administrative process,
before suit has been filed in court. The EEOC has not stated that back
pay should be extended in cases of exceptionally aggressive and
abusive discovery during litigation. Plaintiffs' attorneys have suggested
that "[u]sing an imprudent private investigator, invading the plaintiff's
privacy, bringing the plaintiff into disrepute among friends or acquain90
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tances, and similarly extreme steps, "32 during discovery should also
justify a deviation from the McKennon limitation on back pay damages.
Overzealous discovery practices, however, are unlikely to be
considered "extraordinary equitable circumstances" by the courts.
Discovery abuses can be addressed by the courts through a variety of
channels including sanctions and protective orders. The extent and
nature of discovery means are routinely challenged by the parties,
particularly in discrimination cases involving highly personal and
emotional issues. The Supreme Court itself in McKennon suggested
that traditional means such as the award of attorney fees and Rule 11
sanctions be utilized to deter and punish inappropriate conduct during
litigation. Consequently, the use of questionable discovery methods
should not justify a deviation from the McKennon standard.
Employers are entitled to utilize after-acquired evidence to limit
liability under McKennon and have a financial incentive to discover the
evidence as quickly as possible. Moreover, in order to establish a valid
defense to unlawful termination cases, employers often must examine
questions regarding the employee's job performance and qualifications. The EEOC Guidance thus could not have meant to forbid the
employer from conducting nonabusive and reasonable research into
the employee's background during the EEOC's administrative process.
Instead, the EEOC condemned retaliatory investigations commenced
solely for the purpose of unearthing "derogatory" information which
would serve only to embarrass the complaining party or which were
designed to deter other employees from filing charges via harassment
and ridicule of the individual in question. Such conduct by the
employer during the EEOC's administrative process, which is not
subject to constraint by the court since the case is not yet in litigation,
may in extreme circumstances be deemed to justify an extension of the
back pay award under the McKennon standard.
In addition, courts may consider the nature and severity of the
discrimination itself in formulating the remedy in a particular case. In
some instances the discriminatory termination may be accompanied by
abusive conduct such as racial slurs or violence or the discharge may
be designed maliciously to maximize harm to the victim, such as where
an older worker is unlawfully terminated while the employer knows
his or her spouse is severely ill and needs costly medical treatment. In
such egregious cases courts may not allow employers to utilize afteracquired evidence to limit recovery.

CONCLUSION
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. the Supreme
Employee Relations L. J./Vol. 22, No. 2/Autumn 1996
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Court delineated guidelines as to how after-acquired evidence affects
the remedy available to the complaining party in cases where unlawful
discrimination is proved but the employer discovers evidence of
employee misconduct that was severe enough to justify the plaintiff's
termination had it been previously known. The Court's ruling has been
explicated in EEOC Guidance and by other commentators.
In cases where the employer can establish that it would in fact have
terminated the employee for the misconduct, reinstatement and front
pay awards are inappropriate. In general, back pay awards and
pecuniary compensatory damages are limited to damages that accrued
between the date of the unlawful discharge and the date of discovery
of the wrongful conduct. Compensatory and punitive damages awards
should not be reduced due to after-acquired evidence, and liquidated
damages are by definition limited to the amount of back pay awarded.
Attorney fees present the most difficult question, since they are
discussed by neither the Supreme Court nor the EEOC Guidance.
Attorney fees should probably be limited in after-acquired evidence
cases to reflect the employee's failure to defeat the employer's
affirmative defense and to avoid a limitation of the remedy.
The McKennon decision has been criticized as devaluing the
employer's rights and the public's interest in deterring misconduct. 33
Commentators have utilized the example of convicted criminals who have
omitted their convictions from application materials, thereby depriving
employers of the opportunity to make informed hiring decisions. 34
Arguably, individuals who know they will be entitled to recovery if they
become victims of discrimination may not be sufficiently deterred from
attempting to gain access to the workplace by deceit.
The deterrence argument assumes, however, that employees or
applicants commit the misconduct with the expectation that they will
suffer discrimination in the future. This assumption is unrealistic since
the likelihood that any particular individual will suffer employment
discrimination and prevail in a court action is unpredictable and
minute. An employee whose misconduct is undeterred by the fear of
discovery, by the threat of criminal action, or by moral considerations,
would certainly not be deterred by the remote chance that he or she
will suffer discrimination in the future and be unable to obtain a
complete recovery because of past wrongdoing.
Furthermore, as one commentator has suggested, employers that
are injured by employee misconduct may file counterclaims against the
employee, seeking their own relief.3 5 Thus, an employee who makes
costly mistakes because he or she does not have the qualifications
claimed on the resume or who violates company policy, thereby
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Employee Relations L. f./Val. 22, No. 2/Autumn 1996

THE AFrER-ACQUIRED EviDENCE

RuLE: THE BEST oF ALL PossiBLE WoRLDs?

injuring the employer, may be entitled to damages for discrimination
but may also be liable to the employer for the wrongful conduct.
The McKennon opinion strives to structure guidelines for remedies
that consider both the rights of employees to be free of discrimination
and "the lawful prerogatives of the employer in the usual course of its
business." Given the. complexity and the sensitive nature of the issues
involved in after-acquired evidence cases, the Court offered an
admirably balanced approach to resolving damages issues implicating
the competing rights, concerns, and injuries of the parties in such cases.
Nevertheless, certain ambiguities and questions remain concerning the
McKennon standard, which will continue to evolve and crystallize as
relevant cases come before the EEOC and the courts.
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